Given the recent experience, there is a growing interest in the liquidity trap; which occurs when the nominal interest rate reaches its zero lower bound. We outline the surprising policy recommendations when there is the possibility of a zero lower bound. Then, using the Dixit-Lambertini (2003) framework of strategic policy interaction between the Treasury and the Central Bank, we …nd that the optimal institutional response to the possibility of a liquidity trap has two main components. First, an optimal in ‡ation target is given to the Central Bank. Second, the Treasury, who retains control over …scal policy and acts as Stackelberg leader, is given optimal output and in ‡ation targets. This institutional solution achieves the optimal rational expectations pre-commitment solution.
Introduction
In its classical form, the liquidity trap, a term coined by Keynes (1936) , is a situation where an economy is caught up in a de ‡ation and the nominal interest rate has been driven down to zero (the so called 'zero lower bound'). The source of a liquidity trap, in most circumstances, is a sharp fall in aggregate demand; see Keynes (1936) , Bernanke (2002) .
Interest in the liquidity trap has revived in recent years due, in no small measure, to the experience of Japan since 1990. Woodford (2005, p.29) discusses the near miss of the US economy from a liquidity trap in the summer of 2003. The era of successful delegation of monetary policy to independent central banks with low in ‡ation targets opens up the possibility that su¢ ciently large negative demand shocks might push an economy into a liquidity trap with huge associated welfare consequences. Recent policy discussions on either side of the Atlantic have expressed concerns about the nominal interest rate hitting the zero lower bound. 1 In a liquidity trap, traditional monetary policy loses its e¤ectiveness because nominal interest rates can be reduced no further in order to boost the interest sensitive components of aggregate demand. Hence, reliance must be placed on other, possibly more expensive, policies. Keynes (1936) , in the …rst policy prescription for a liquidity trap, suggested the use of …scal policy, which works through the multiplier e¤ect to boost output and employment.
The modern literature on the liquidity trap
The recent literature has largely focussed on the role of in ‡ation expectations in a liquidity trap. To see this, note that the real interest rate, r, is given by r = i e , where i is the nominal interest rate and e is expected in ‡ation. In a liquidity trap, by de…nition, i = 0, and due to de ‡ationary expectations, typically e < 0, hence, r > 0. To expand economic activity, the government needs to lower r. One possible solution, suggested by Krugman (1998 Krugman ( , 1999 , is to generate positive in ‡ationary expectations, e > 0, so that the real interest rate r < 0. This, in turn, creates a need for a credible commitment to the future level of actual in ‡ation because 1 In an article on Bloomberg.com on 6 July 2009, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco President, Janet Yellen, is reported to have told reporters after a speech in San Francisco: "We have a very serious recession, we have a 9.4 percent unemployment rate... Given the recession's severity, we should want to do more. If we were not at zero, we would be lowering the funds rate." The Economist wrote on November 13, 2008 that: "Remember Japan's zero interest rates? America is almost there too. Since October 29th, ...the "e¤ective rate", has averaged around 0.25%..." The Telegraph, a national daily in Britain reported in January 2009 that the interest rate has been cut to it's lowest level in the last 300 years to 1.5% and went on to say that: "Further cuts are expected in the next few months and the base rate may be reduced to zero this year." after the economy has escaped from the liquidity trap it is in the interest of all parties to reduce in ‡ation. A forward looking private sector will anticipate this and expect low future in ‡ation. But then the real interest rate remains high, keeping the economy in a liquidity trap. The era of low in ‡ation targets exacerbates the problem, because such targets lead to low values of e and, so, the real interest cannot be reduced low enough to boost recovery in a liquidity trap. The literature on the liquidity trap has considered a range of solutions, e.g., exchange rate policies such as currency depreciation, integral stabilization, a carry tax on currency, open market operations in long term bonds, price level targets, and money growth rate pegs. The surveys in Svensson (2003) and Blinder (2000) consider these policies in detail. However, these policies have important limitations 2;3 . Eggertsson (2006a Eggertsson ( , 2006b ) recommends abandonment of an independent central bank and a return to discretionary policy by a unitary monetary-…scal authority. A debt …nanced …scal expansion during a liquidity trap results, via the government budget constraint, in higher expectations of future in ‡a-tion. Eggertsson shows that this solution is superior to either monetary policy alone or uncoordinated monetary and …scal policy. However, as Eggertsson shows, even optimal discretion is inferior to the fully optimal rational expectations solution with commitment. Moreover, abandoning delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank with a narrow mandate, in favor of a return to discretion, appears to be a retrograde step.
several recent works on the Japanese experience 5 we cull out the following three stylized facts, S1-S3, about the Japanese experience which, we believe, must be respected, at the minimum, by any model of a liquidity trap that makes economic policy prescriptions. 6 S1. Fiscal policy is potent in a liquidity trap: Whenever the net …scal stance was expansionary, it worked well and the de…cit spending multipliers were signi…cant, and large. However, the net …scal stance was typically contractionary or neutral.
7
S2. The response to a liquidity trap is inadequate if the Treasury or the Central Banks are not given appropriate targets: There were no explicit in ‡ation or output targets given to either the Treasury or to the Central Bank. So, the …scal stance was typically contractionary, or neutral, and the monetary policy reaction was too little, too late.
S3. Lack of coordination between the Treasury and the Central Bank hampers policy response in a liquidity trap: The Treasury and the Central Bank may disagree about an appropriate response and also di¤er about their respective spheres of responsibility, if not well de…ned. They might end up taking policy actions that are counter to each other or cancel each other out and so, on net, are not expansionary. 8 Furthermore, models of a liquidity trap must make the following modelling choices, M1-M2.
M1
. Models belong to either one of two categories. In the …rst category are models with an ex-ante perspective that recognize the possibility of a liquidity trap in the future. The focus of such models is on the optimal design of institutions in order to reduce/eliminate the consequences arising from a liquidity trap. In the second category are models with an ex-post perspective that propose policy solutions, conditional on an economy having already slipped into a liquidity trap.
M2. Economics recommends aiming for an optimal level of 'economic bads'(e.g., externalities), rather than their complete elimination. Clearly, the optimal policy must balance the marginal cost of removal of the economic bads against the marginal bene…ts. In the context of a liquidity trap, the optimal policy recommendation might, therefore, turn out to be one that lets the economy fall into a liquidity trap with some probability rather than completely eliminating the possibility of a liquidity trap. . 6 See the working paper version of the paper, Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007), for the details. 7 See, for instance, Posen (1998), Kuttner and Posen (2001) and Eggertsson (2006b) . 8 See, for instance, the empirical evidence in Iwamura et al (2005) and Eggertsson (2006b). 9 A dental analogy might be appropriate here. Tooth decay can be prevented by extracting all the child's teeth. But, normally, the optimal policy is not to extract; tooth decay then occurs with some probability.
Our approach to modeling a liquidity trap
Our model of a liquidity trap takes explicit account of all the three stylized facts, S1, S2, S3. We consider strategic interaction between monetary and …scal authorities in a simple aggregate supply -aggregate demand model similar to the one in Dixit and Lambertini (2003) and Lambertini and Rovelli (2003) but extended to allow for a liquidity trap and the e¤ect of in ‡ationary expectations in the aggregate supply curve. Our perspective is ex-ante, i.e., we focus on the design of institutions, namely, the appropriate incentives for the Treasury and the Central Bank, prior to the occurrence of a liquidity trap (M1). In our model, we …nd it optimal to allow the economy to fall into a liquidity trap with some probability (M2).
Issues of strategic policy interaction between monetary and …scal authorities are completely ignored by the theoretical work on the liquidity trap. Typically, the only policy considered is monetary policy and so issues of strategic interaction do not arise 10 . On the other hand, when several policies are simultaneously considered, their strategic interaction is not allowed for. 11 One strand of the literature considers policies that could mitigate the e¤ects of liquidity traps. The other strand prescribes policies that would prevent the economy from ever falling into a liquidity trap. 12 Some papers in the literature take an ex-ante perspective, while others take an ex-post perspective. 13 .
Some results and intuition
As pointed out above, Krugman identi…ed the solution to a liquidity trap as creating high enough in ‡ationary expectations. However, under discretion, promises of high in ‡ation will not be believed. This is because, outside a liquidity trap, the correct value for the real interest rate can be achieved more cheaply with zero in ‡ation. Therefore, if the economy turns out not to be liquidity trapped, the Treasury has an incentive to renege on its promise 10 Examples are Krugman (1998) of high in ‡ation. A rational forward looking private sector will anticipate this. The result is low in ‡ation expectations, keeping the real interest rate too high in a liquidity trap. Notice that unlike the standard analysis conducted in the absence of a liquidity trap, the discretionary outcome can be suboptimal relative to the precommitment outcome because it creates too little in ‡ation (Eggertsson (2006a,b) calls this the de ‡ation bias).
We suggest an institutional solution, the optimal delegation regime, that achieves the optimal rational expectations precommitment solution for all parameter values in our model. This regime has three components. First, the Treasury acts as the Stackelberg leader and the Central Bank as the follower. Second, an in ‡ation target is given to a Central Bank who has exclusive control over monetary policy. Outside a liquidity trap, where monetary policy is e¤ective, the Treasury would rather not use the relatively more costly …scal stabilization policy, leaving the Central Bank to perform the stabilization function. Because the Central Bank is operationally independent and its sole objective is achieving monetary stability, this type of delegation provides a commitment to the necessary in ‡ation level when the economy is not in a liquidity trap. Our third component is to give the Treasury, who retains control of …scal policy, something like a Taylor rule, which penalizes deviations of output from an output target and in ‡ation from an in ‡ation target. This gives the Treasury the correct incentive to undertake the appropriate (but costly) …scal stimulus in a liquidity trap where monetary policy is ine¤ective. Consequently, in ‡ation expectations are at the right level to produce the correct value for the real interest rate in a liquidity trap.
Furthermore, the optimal delegation regime achieves the optimal mix between monetary and …scal policy as we now explain. Theoretically, society could give a su¢ ciently high in ‡ation target to the Central Bank which in turn generates su¢ ciently high in ‡ation expectations so that the nominal interest rate never hits its zero ‡oor (see modelling choice M2, above). While this policy would always avoid the liquidity trap, it is not optimal because in ‡ation is costly. Analogously, it is not optimal to give the Treasury too high an output target because if a liquidity trap occurs, it would use the costly …scal policy excessively. The optimal solution then is to have a mix of both, i.e., some in ‡ation outside a liquidity trap and some dependence on …scal policy in a liquidity trap.
The …rst best is achieved if one could remove the distortions that cause the liquidity trap. The second best obtains with the optimal rational expectations commitment solution. The third best is achieved with various institutional design features introduced into policy making. The fourth best obtains under discretion.
14 It is well known that, in the absence of a liquidity trap, 'optimal institution design', such as Walsh contracts, can achieve the second best. 15 Our suggested institutional design achieves the second best in the presence of a liquidity trap; see section 4, below.
Schematic outline
The model is formulated in Section 2. Section 3 derives the two benchmark solutions: the optimal rational expectations precommitment solution and the discretionary solution. Section 4 derives the optimal delegation solution. Section 5 concludes. Proofs can be found in the appendix.
Model
We describe the most parsimonious version of the model in this paper. At substantial costs in terms of complexity, and much reduced pedagogical clarity, the model can be shown to be robust with respect to the following extensions. 16 The full set of parameters in the aggregate demand and supply curves, persistent demand shocks, a general probability distribution over the two states of nature, and further considerations about the Treasury's objectives.
Aggregate Demand and Aggregate Supply
We use an aggregate demand and supply framework that is similar to recent work on strategic monetary-…scal policy interaction, e.g., Ball (2005) , Dixit and Lambertini (2003) and Lambertini and Rovelli (2003) . The aggregate demand and supply equations are given by, respectively
where y is the deviation of output from its natural rate and f captures …scal policy 18 . For example, f > 0 could denote a …scal de…cit (either debt …nanced or money …nanced 19 ) while f < 0, denotes a …scal surplus. But f could also denote a temporary balanced 16 See the working paper version, Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007), for a full proof of these claims. Some of the expressions run into more than a page and so are not convenient to print. 17 Extension to a full set of parameters for the AS and AD curves is possible at substantial increase in complexity; see Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) . 18 To be more precise, f is the stabilization component of …scal policy (which varies over the business cycle). Total …scal policy can be represented by F = f 0 +f , where f 0 denotes the …xed …scal commitments of the government. 19 In principal, these alternative modes of …nance need not be equivalent. However, in the context of a liquidity trap, Ball (2005) shows that there are no long run di¤erences arising from these alternative modes of …nance. budget reallocation of taxes and subsidies that has a net expansionary e¤ect; for instance Dixit and Lambertini (2000) . i 0 is the nominal interest rate, is the rate of in ‡ation, e is expected in ‡ation and, in keeping with the modern literature on the liquidity trap, is a demand shock 20 . We assume rational expectations on behalf of the public. So, if x is a random variable and E(x) is its mathematical expectation, then the expectation, x e , of
x formed by a decision maker is
3)
The instruments of policy are the nominal interest rate, i, and the stabilization component of …scal policy, f . For simplicity, let the demand shock, , be independently distributed and take only two values, a; a, with equal probability, where a > 0, hence
The aggregate demand equation re ‡ects the fact that demand is increasing in the …scal impulse, f , and decreasing in the real interest rate, r = i e . Demand is also a¤ected by demand shocks. The aggregate supply equation shows that deviations of output from the natural rate are caused by unexpected movements in the rate of in ‡ation.
Equating aggregate demand and supply we get from (2.1) and (2.2), our reduced form equations for output and in ‡ation.
Hence, …scal policy, monetary policy and in ‡ation expectations (in the spirit of New Keynesian models) have an a¤ect on output (and so also on unemployment) and in ‡ation. 22 
Notation and the rational expectations condition
We shall write a variable with a subscript (sometimes a superscript) 'H', for example, y H and U H T , to denote the realization of these variables in the good (or high) state of the 20 Our framework can be easily extended to incorporate supply, as well as demand, shocks. 21 The results do not depend on the demand shock taking only two possible values, although it allows for a particularly clear exposition. The results hold for a general probability distribution over demand shocks that, furthermore, exhibit persistence, see Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) 22 The analogy with New Keynesian models is quite strong. There are no structural dynamics in our model. Hence, if policy rules are also stationary (as they will be in our model), then e t = e t+1 . The AS-curve (2.2) can then be written as y t = t e t+1 , i.e., the expected change in the in ‡ation rate is related to the output gap, as in the New Keynesian Phillips curve. Similarly, the AD-curve (2.1) can be written in a form reminiscent of the New Keynesian IS-curve. We are grateful to Referee 2 for these observations. world, = a. Analogously, to denote the realization of the same variables in the bad (or low) state of the world, = a, we use a subscript (sometimes a superscript) 'L', for example, y L and U L T . Since the states = a and = a occur with equal probability, the average or expected value of any stochastic variable, x, is E (x) = 1 2
e and, hence,
Microfoundations
Our model is inspired by the microfounded dynamic model of monopolistic competition and staggered price setting in Lambertini (2000, 2003) . Our structural model in (2.1), (2.2) (or its variant with the full set of parameters in Dhami and al-Nowaihi, 2007) is similar to the Dixit and Lambertini model. 23 In the Dixit and Lambertini framework, unexpected movements in in ‡ation have real e¤ects because prices are staggered. Alternatively, a range of 'rational inattention'theories currently compete as potential explanations for the presence of the unexpected in ‡ation term in (2.2). For instance, see Sims (2003) . 24 To simplify the dynamic game-theoretic analysis Dixit-Lambertini follow the tradition, established in the time-inconsistency literature 25 , of abstracting from structural dynamic issues, notably, capital formation, the term structure of interest rates, exchange rate policy and the …nancing of the stabilization component of …scal policy. Concentrating on the aggregate demand consequences of investment expenditure, but abstracting from its 23 However, our model has the following di¤erences from the Dixit-Lambertini model. (1) If the natural rate of output is normalized to zero, then, the additive shock (in (2.1) or in (2.5)) can also be interpreted as a shock to the natural rate of output. (2) Our model has the New Keynesian feature that expected in ‡ation, e , also a¤ects actual in ‡ation, . (3) Our stochastic structure allows persistence (see Dhami and al-Nowaihi, 2007 ). While there is no persistence in Dixit-Lambertini, they allow all parameters to be stochastic, hence, considering the possibility of non-additive shocks. (4) In our model, a …scal impulse acts on the demand side, creating greater output and in ‡ation. However, in the Dixit-Lambertini model, …scal policy works on the supply side and takes the form of a subsidy to imperfectly competitive …rms that increases output but reduces prices. 24 Most dynamic structural models used in the analysis of a liquidity trap are forward looking New Keynesian models. Gertler (2003) , Mankiw (2002) note dissatisfaction with this model in terms of its inability to explain persistence in the data. Recent work, for instance, Rudd and Whelan (2006), casts doubt even on the hybrid variant proposed by Gali and Gertler (1999) . Of course, similar criticisms apply to the version of our model microfounded along the lines of Dixit and Lambertini (2003) . Thus, all current macroeconomic models lack satisfactory microfoundations. 25 See, for example, Romer (2006, chapter 10) and Walsh (2003, chapter 8) .
contribution to growth, is standard in models of the business cycle, and is, as far as we know, a feature of all existing models of the liquidity trap. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) , in a structurally dynamic model of monetary policy with a …nancial sector and a zero lower bound on interest rates, show that the short-run interest rate (which is the instrument of policy) determines all other interest rates and exchange rates. As they clearly explain, open market operations only work to the extent that they enhance the credibility of policy. Thus, and in common with many models, we take the short-run interest rate as directly a¤ecting aggregate demand and we abstract from open economy aspects.
We o¤er two arguments that mitigate not explicitly modelling the government budget constraint. First, we shall assign a higher welfare loss to the use of …scal policy relative to monetary policy. The cost of using …scal policy could include deadweight losses, costs of servicing debt and a risk premium for default. Second, in all equilibria of our model, …scal policy is not used for stabilization purposes outside a liquidity trap. In a calibrated model of Japan, Ball (2005) shows that the combination of higher output, higher tax revenues and higher in ‡ation outside the liquidity trap is more than adequate to …nance the extra …scal spending during the liquidity trap. See subsection 4.3, below, for further discussion of this issue.
Social Preferences
Society's preferences over output and in ‡ation are given by the social welfare function,
The …rst term shows that departures of output from its desired level, y (note that y is the di¤erence between desired output and the natural rate), are costly. We assume that y 0.
(2.10)
This captures the fact that the natural level of output is socially suboptimal (unless y = 0) 26 .
The second term in (2.9) makes the standard assumption that in ‡ation reduces social welfare. The third term captures the fact that the exercise of …scal policy is more costly 26 The microfoundations for this in Lambertini (2000, 2003) rest on the presence of monopolistic competition. Monopoly power in the product market reduces output below the e¢ cient level, hence, giving policy makers an incentive to raise output. There are also a large number of other well known reasons for (2.10) but the ultimate cause, argue Alesina and Tabellini (1987) , is the absence of non-distortionary taxes. For if they were available then other market failures could be corrected.
than that of monetary policy 27 . We model this as imposing a strictly positive cost of …scal policy, f 2 , but no cost of using the monetary policy 28 . The cost of using …scal policy could include deadweight losses, as in Dixit and Lambertini (2003) , costs of servicing debt and a risk premium for default. 29 From (2.9), we see that the …rst best obtains when = 0, f = 0, and y = y. However, from (2.1) and (2.2), it follows that this cannot be an outcome of a rational expectations equilibrium (unless y = 0). On the microfoundations of the social welfare function, in (2.9), see Lambertini (2000, 2003) , Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) .
Substituting (2.5) and (2.6) into (2.9), we get
In the light of subsection 2.2, and using (2.11), the expected social welfare is
Substituting (2.8) in (2.12), the expected social welfare becomes
Sequence of Moves
In the …rst stage, the economy designs its institutions, which assign to one or two independent policy makers (i.e., the Treasury and the Central Bank) their respective domains of decision making. This is followed by the formation of in ‡ationary expectations, e , and the signing of nominal wage contracts in anticipation of future in ‡ation. Next, the demand shock, , is realized. Conditional on the actual realization of the shock, the relevant policy makers then decide on the optimal values of the policy variables, f and i. 27 Fiscal policy is typically more cumbersome to alter, on account of the cost of changing it (balanced budget requirements, lobby groups etc.). Indeed the 'monetary policy committee'in the UK or the 'Fed' in the USA meet on a regular basis to make decisions on the interest rate while changes to the tax rates are much less frequent. 28 Strictly speaking, for our qualitative results to hold, we only require that …scal policy be relatively more expensive than the (possibly strictly positive) cost of using monetary policy. Normalizing the cost of using monetary policy to zero, however, ensures greater tractability and transparency of the results. 29 See Eser et al. (2009) for a microfounded discussion of why …scal policy is a relatively more costly stabilization instrument.
We shall also derive the optimal rational expectations solution (precommitment benchmark) in which the last stage is conducted up-front, i.e., the (state contingent) policy variables f and i are announced to the economy prior to the resolution of demand uncertainty.
The Precommitment and Discretionary Solutions
We …rst calculate the globally optimal solution in the class of all rational expectations solutions in subsection 3.1 30 . Strictly speaking, this is a second best solution. The …rst best obtains if the imperfections responsible for the liquidity trap are removed. But because it is only second best, there is 'room for improvement'. Speci…cally, once the public has formed its expectations of in ‡ation, the government has the incentive to launch a 'surprise in ‡ation'or, in the case of a liquidity trap, a 'surprise de ‡ation', that is potentially welfare improving. This destroys the credibility of the optimal solution in the eyes of a rational public. Thus, if the government retains control over monetary policy (the discretionary regime), the outcome is even worse (third best). This is considered in subsection 3.2, below. However, the global optimality of the precommitment solution serves as a useful benchmark.
The Precommitment Regime (The optimal rational expectations solution)
The sequence of moves is described in …gure 3.1, below. The full solution is given in the Table below.
= a < 0 = a > 0 e = 0:5a + 0:5a = 0 Interest rate
Since the economy is liquidity trapped when = a, monetary policy is ine¤ective in this case, i L = 0. Hence, the government resorts to using the expensive …scal policy,
a, in order to 'lean against the wind'. By contrast, when = a, monetary policy is e¤ective, i H = 6 5 a, and the government has no need for the expensive …scal instrument, so f H = 0.
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Recalling that y denotes deviation of output from the natural level, output is below the natural rate in the liquidity trap ( = a) but above it otherwise ( = a). On average, it equals the natural rate. In ‡ation is positive in both states of the world. The real interest rate is negative 32 in the liquidity trap but positive otherwise and on average.
Recall that the shocks take the two possible values, a and a and, so, V ar ( ) = a 2 .
Thus, on average, ceteris paribus, in ‡ation, interest rates and the …scal instrument of the government will display greater variability in economies where demand shocks exhibit greater variability and precommitment is possible. Furthermore, the magnitude of policy instruments employed in the two states of the world, f L = 2 5 a and i H = 6 5 a, are increasing in the size of the shock. This is not surprising as each of these policies ful…lls a stabilization role and a larger shock elicits a greater e¤ort in "leaning against the wind".
The solution is independent of y, society's desired output relative to the natural rate. As in time consistency models in the absence of the liquidity trap, this occurs because even if society has a high y, the precommitment technology allows it to counter expectations of ex-post surprise in ‡ation (designed to push output towards the high target).
The magnitude of social welfare in this regime depends negatively on the variance of shocks hitting the economy, a 2 , and negatively on the output target of society, y.
Finally, note that the values of the instruments, i H , i L , f H , f L , are optimal ex-ante. However, after the realization of the shock, = a or = a, the ex-post optimal values 31 Recall that f refers only to the stabilization component of …scal policy, hence, f H = 0 is consistent with a strictly positive level of government expenditure on other items such as redistribution etc. 32 We conjecture that the combination of rigid wages-prices and a ‡exible nominal interest rate has the e¤ect that the real interest rate, i e , overshoots so as to equilibrate the economy. of i, f will, in general, be di¤erent from these. Thus, for successful implementation, this optimal rational expectations solution needs a precommitment technology. We discuss this in Section 4 below. Next, we turn to the second regime in the paper, discretion.
Discretionary Regime
In the discretionary regime, the monetary instrument, i, and the …scal instrument, f , are both assigned to the Treasury. We calculate the time consistent discretionary policy. The sequence of moves is described in …gure 3.2, below. Proposition 2 : For y < a 2y, the economy is liquidity trapped for = a < 0 but not liquidity trapped for = a > 0. The expected social welfare is given by E U Disc S = 12ay 8y 2 5a
To …nd the discretionary solution, we …rst need to …nd the values of the policy variables
2 . The full solution under discretion is given in the Table below . 33 The full set of results under discretion is given in Appendix-B of Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007).
= a < 0 = a > 0 e = 0:5a + 0:5a = 0 Interest rate For stabilization purposes, the costly …scal policy is used only in a liquidity trap when the monetary policy looses e¤ectiveness. As in the precommitment solution, deviations of output from the natural rate are zero on average, i.e., y e = 0. The following proposition compares expected social welfare under Precommitment with that under Discretion. As one would expect, the presence of a liquidity trap does not alter the ranking between the Precommitment and the Discretion regimes, from a social welfare point of view. In fact, the ranking E U Disc S
< E U
Opt S holds for all parameter values. However, we have only reported it for the most interesting case, namely, when a liquidity trap occurs.
Alice through the looking glass
Krugman (1998) observed that 'applying conventional modelling to liquidity trap conditions produces unconventional conclusions and policy recommendations'. To which he added (1999) 'The whole subject of the liquidity trap has a sort of Alice-through-thelooking-glass quality'. And indeed, our model exhibits these features, as we will now see.
Precommitment can have higher in ‡ation than Discretionary
It is well known in the traditional time inconsistency literature, in the absence of a liquidity trap, that the optimal level of average in ‡ation is zero (given (2.9)) while under discretion it is positive (unless y = 0, in which case it is also zero). The reason is that under discretion, agents perceive (correctly) that the government has an ex-post incentive to create surprise in ‡ation, while under precommitment, ex-post surprise in ‡ation is institutionally ruled out. When a liquidity trap occurs with a positive probability, this result changes dramatically.
From Proposition 1, we see that the optimal level of average in ‡ation under precommitment now is positive ( e = 2a=5), rather than zero. Under discretion, e depends on y.
For y = a=2, Proposition 2 gives a negative average expected in ‡ation rate ( e = a=2), rather than a positive one. Eggertsson (2006a Eggertsson ( , 2006b ) calls this the de ‡ation bias. The intuitive explanation is as follows. Under precommitment, it is optimal to have positive in ‡ation on average ( e = 2a=5), despite its cost, to be able to deliver negative real interest rates (i L e = 2a=5) in the bad state of the world ( = a). However, this optimal policy is time inconsistent. If ex-post, the economy is in the good state ( = a) then the optimal real interest rate is positive (i H e = 4a=5) which can be achieved more cheaply with zero in ‡ation. Hence, the policy maker has the incentive to renege on its commitment to positive in ‡ation. The rational private sector will perceive this and expect low future in ‡ation. This destroys the credibility of the announcement of high in ‡ation, unless a commitment technology is available.
Higher output targets are a good thing
In the standard textbook model in the absence of a liquidity trap, a higher value of desired output relative to the natural rate, y > 0; is bad because it leads to high in ‡ation and no gain in output (y e = 0). The reverse occurs with a liquidity trap. y > 0 is now good!
The intuition is that a higher y increases in ‡ationary expectations (see Proposition 2), which by reducing the real interest rate in a liquidity trap, reduces the need for using the expensive …scal instrument. If society has a high enough output target (and the Treasury follows it) then, in the discretionary regime, ex-post, a liquidity trap will not arise. However, this outcome might require using the costly …scal instrument excessively, which could be suboptimal. In section 4, below, we show this to be precisely the case.
Institutions and Delegation
In the delegation regime considered in this section, society gives the Central Bank the mandate of achieving an in ‡ation target B . The monetary instrument, which is the nominal interest rate, i, is assigned to the Central Bank whose objective is to attain the in ‡ation target B . We formalize this by assigning the following objective function to the Central Bank,
The …scal instrument, f , is controlled by the Treasury whose objective function is similar to that of society in (2.9) but with, possibly, di¤erent in ‡ation and output targets,
The output target of the Treasury is given by y T . It is important to bear in mind the di¤erence between the socially desirable output level, y, and the Treasury's output target, y T . In order to maximize the social objective function in (2.9), society might assign some target value, y T , of y T to the Treasury. The Treasury is assumed to comply with the target y T even if y T 6 = y. It seems reasonable, though not necessary, to assign the same in ‡ation target to the Treasury, T = B , as assigned to the Central Bank. 34 
The Optimal Delegation Regime
Under optimal delegation, the game has the following …ve sequential stages.
1. Society optimally assigns an in ‡ation target, B , to the Central Bank and the output, in ‡ation targets, y T ; T to the Treasury.
2. The public observes B ; y T ; T and then forms in ‡ationary expectations, e .
3. The demand shock, , which takes two possible values, a; a, is realised.
4. The Treasury (Stackelberg leader) sets state contingent …scal policy f ( e ; ).
The Cental Bank (Stackelberg follower) sets state contingent monetary policy i ( e ; ).
Given the sequence of moves, the Central Bank sets monetary policy taking as given the …scal policy set by the Treasury. The Treasury sets …scal policy, taking into account the anticipated response of the Central Bank. We solve the game backwards. First we obtain the Central Bank's optimal reaction function i = i ( B ; e ; f; ) by maximizing U B .
Second, we …nd the Treasury's optimal reaction function f = f (y T ; T; e ; ) by maximizing U T . This allows us to derive output and in ‡ation as functions of y T , T , B , e , . Third,
we determine e , assuming rational expectations on the part of the private sector. Fourth, we …nd the expected social welfare, EU S , as a function of y T , T , B , which we maximize to …nd the optimal values of y T , T , B , denoted by y T , T , B . We assume that the Treasury and Central Bank fully comply with the objectives assigned to them. We now state our main result in Proposition 4, i.e., the optimal delegation regime achieves the optimal rational expectations solution. y. The economy is liquidity trapped only under adverse demand shocks. In ‡ation and output targets are achieved in the good state but not in the bad state. 34 Our analysis allows one to consider both the cases: T = B and T 6 = B : 35 As stressed by Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) , failure to meet the in ‡ation target in the liquidity trap does not signify failure of policy. A similar remark can be made with respect to the output target.
The next proposition shows that our suggested institutional solution is very ‡exible in terms of the mixture between optimal output and in ‡ation contracts for the Treasury. We discuss this proposition in section 5 below.
Proposition 5 : Any mixture of output and in ‡ation targets for the Treasury, y T , T , that satisfy y T + T = 4 5 a, will achieve the optimal rational expectations (precommitment) solution (see Proposition 1 and 4), provided B = B = 3 5 a.
Credibility

36
There is an in…nity of pairs of output-in ‡ation targets for the Treasury that implement the optimal rational expectations (precommitment) solution. However, one particular pair in which the Central Bank's and Treasury's optimal in ‡ation targets coincide, i.e., (y T ; T ) = (y T ; B ) = 1 5 a; 3 5 a has special salience. To see this, compare (y T ; B ) with the other candidate in which output equals its natural level, i.e., (y T ; T ) = 0; 4 5 a . 37 Note the following features of the candidate 0; 4 5 a : (1) 0; 4 5 a sets the Treasury an in ‡ation target, 4 5 a, greater than that assigned to the Bank,
a. (2) The in ‡ation target, 4 5 a, is never achieved (in any state of the world). (3) The output target, y = 0, is only achieved on average but neither when the economy is liquidity trapped ( = a) nor when non-liquidity trapped ( = a). (4) It would appear strange to the public that the Treasury and Bank are assigned di¤erent in ‡ation targets.
By contrast, the target (y T ; B ) = 1 5 a; 3 5 a has the following attractive features. (1) It is achieved during normal times, i.e., when the economy is not liquidity trapped (recall Proposition 1, which is implemented by these targets). (2) The Bank and the Treasury are assigned the same in ‡ation target which is important for reasons of transparency and credibility of policy. For these reasons, we believe that (y T ; B ) = 1 5 a; 3 5 a is the superior choice from the set of all targets consistent with Proposition 5. 38 Why does the optimal delegation regime perform so well? The in ‡ation target given to the Central Bank provides a commitment to the necessary in ‡ation level when the economy is not in a liquidity trap. In the absence of such a target, there will be an incentive to reduce in ‡ation outside a liquidity trap. Such a commitment a¤ects the (ex-ante) in ‡ation expectations ensuring the correct value for the real interest rate in a liquidity trap. Furthermore, in ‡ationary expectations are also in ‡uenced correctly by the output and in ‡ation targets given to the Treasury. The latter provide the Treasure with the incentive to use the appropriate level of …scal policy in a liquidity trap. Such an institutional regime achieves the optimal balance between …scal and monetary policy by 36 We are grateful to both referees for raising the issues discussed here. 37 Note that both (y T ; B ) = neither having to rely too much on costly in ‡ation outside the liquidity trap nor relying too much on costly …scal policy in a liquidity trap. Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) show that these results generalize to more general probability distributions of the shocks, persistence in shocks, full set of parameters of the aggregate demand and aggregate supply curves and more general objectives of the Treasury. These generalizations serve to assure us that the results of this model do not arise because of the simplicity of the model. Rather, the results are more fundamental. However, the extensions come at a very substantial cost in terms of complexity. The simpler model is pedagogically much superior. While we allow for the economy to fall in a liquidity trap with some probability, this probability, in the more general model can be quite small.
Debt
39
Recall, from Proposition 1, that for the optimal solution, …scal policy is expansionary in a liquidity trap but neutral outside it. Hence, it is expansionary on average. An important question, therefore, relates to the implications for government debt. In particular, is this solution compatible with a bounded debt to GDP ratio? Since the optimal delegation regime implements the optimal solution (Proposition 4), the same issue arises for the optimal solution as well. 40 Our answer is three-fold.
First, as remarked in subsection 2.1, above, f could be a temporary balanced budget reallocation of taxes and subsidies that has a net expansionary e¤ect; as in Dixit and Lambertini (2000) .
Second, the total …scal budget, F , could have two (or more) components: F = f 0 + f + :::, where f 0 is a …xed budget surplus (hence, in our notation, f 0 < 0) and f is the variable component that is positive in a liquidity trap but zero outside it. f 0 can then be chosen so that E (f 0 + f ) = 0 which ensures that the government budget holds in expected terms; see Varian (1980) . Third, suppose that f is …nanced entirely from debt (and assume no surpluses or de…cits are generated out of a liquidity trap). Then f is the magnitude of new nominal debt. Assume that nominal GDP is normalized to one and, so, f is also the ratio of new debt to GDP. Now let us look at in ‡ation, , relative to f . From Proposition 1, f e = a=5 but e = 2a=5. Hence, on average, the new debt, arising from debt …nancing of the …scal expansion in a liquidity trap, could (if desired) be …nanced entirely from in ‡ation. Thus, the fact that …scal policy is, on average, expansionary under optimal delegation is consistent with a bounded debt to GDP ratio.
Related literature
The theoretical literature has considered some aspects of our optimal delegation regime, that achieves the precommitment solution. For instance, in ‡ation targets have been suggested in Krugman (1998) , Nishiyama (2003) , and Iwamura et al. (2005) . Other variants of monetary policy commitment have also been considered. Benhabib Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2002) consider a commitment to switch from an interest rate rule to a money growth rate peg in a liquidity trap. Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) propose a commitment to adjust nominal interest rates to achieve a time varying price level target. Bernanke (2002) suggests a commitment to a bu¤er zone for the in ‡ation rate. Svensson (2003) advocates a price level target (as part of a larger set of policies). However, none of these models allow for the possibility of strategic interaction between monetary and …scal authorities nor jointly derive the optimal set of targets and instruments of the two policy making authorities. Eggertsson (2006a Eggertsson ( , 2006b ) studies the liquidity trap within a new Keynesian stochastic general equilibrium model with a government budget constraint and explicit microfoundations. Eggertsson recommends abandonment of an independent central bank and a return to discretionary policy by a unitary monetary-…scal authority. A debt …nanced …scal expansion during a liquidity trap results, via the government budget constraint, in higher expectations of future in ‡ation. Eggertsson shows that this solution is superior to either monetary policy alone or uncoordinated monetary and …scal policy. However, as Eggertsson shows, even optimal discretion is inferior to the fully optimal rational expectations solution with commitment. Moreover, abandoning delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank with a narrow mandate, in favor of a return to discretion, appears to be a retrograde step. Dixit and Lambertini (2003) and Lambertini and Rovelli (2003) consider strategic interaction between …scal and monetary authorities, but in the absence of a liquidity trap. Lambertini and Rovelli (2003) show that the equilibrium with the …scal authority acting as leader is superior to the Nash equilibrium. Dixit and Lambertini (2003) show that this regime can achieve the optimal precommitment rational expectations solution.
Conclusions
In a liquidity trap, with nominal interest rates bound below by zero, an expectation of positive in ‡ation is needed to reduce the real interest rate and, so, to boost economic activity. This, in turn, needs a credible commitment to a future level of positive actual in ‡ation. The credibility problem comes about because after the economy has escaped from the liquidity trap, it is in the interest of all parties to renegotiate and reduce in ‡ation. A forward looking private sector will anticipate this and expect low future in ‡ation. With low expected future in ‡ation, the real interest rate remains positive, keeping the economy in the liquidity trap; see for instance Krugman (1998) .
The …rst best solution obtains when the rigidities that give rise to the liquidity trap are removed. But removal of these distortions is usually slow and di¢ cult (witness the experience of Japan). Therefore, macroeconomic policy can play an important role. Furthermore, the Japanese experience suggests that issues of strategic monetary …scal policy interaction and of appropriate institutional design, assume even greater importance in a liquidity trap.
In the solution considered in this paper, society delegates monetary policy to an operationally independent Central Bank with an in ‡ation target. Fiscal policy is delegated to the Treasury with in ‡ation and output targets. Furthermore, the Treasury acts as a leader and the Central Bank is the follower. The required institutional arrangements are quite natural and are able to achieve the second best solution, namely, the optimal rational expectations precommitment solution. This institutional setting provides (1) the appropriate level of in ‡ation and, hence, in ‡ation expectations, and (2) the optimal balance between monetary and …scal policy.
Appendix Proof of Proposition 1 (Precommitment)
We seek those values of f L , f H , i L and i H that maximize E (U S ) (as given by (2.13)) subject to i H 0 and i L 0. The …rst order conditions for this are:
From (2.13), (6.1) and (6.2) we get,
From (2.13), (6.3) and (6.4) we get,
Substituting from (6.5) and (6.6) into (6.7) and (6.8), we get,
Suppose the economy was not liquidity trapped in either state. Then (6.9) and (6.10) would imply that i H = a and i L = a; which cannot be since i L 0 and a > 0. Suppose the economy was liquidity trapped in the high state ( = a). Then, i H = 0 and, from (6.9), 1 3 i L + 2a 0; which cannot be, since i L 0 and a > 0. Hence, the only solution to (6.9) and (6.10) is that the economy is liquidity trapped in the low state ( = a) but not in the high state ( = a), with
Substituting from (6.11) into (6.5) and (6.6), gives
From (2.8), (6.11) and (6.12), we get e = 2 5 a. (6.13) From (2.5), (2.6), (6.11), (6.12) and (6.13), we get
From (2.13), (6.11) and (6.12), we get
Proof of Proposition 2 (Discretion) Since f is unrestricted but i 0, the …rst order conditions for maximizing U S (given by (2.11)) are as follows. 21) and, from (6.19), we get The two other cases, when the economy is liquidity trapped in both states or in none, are solved in exactly the same way. In each case it is straightforward to check that expected utility under discretion is less than under commitment. . We start with the case where the economy is liquidity trapped in the bad state ( = a) only. The other cases will be considered at the end. The state contingent reaction function of the monetary authority is given by (6.38) and (6.39) .
Fiscal authority' s reaction function The Treasury now chooses its state contingent …scal policy f to maximize the objective function (4.2) after observing e and and knowing that the state contingent reaction function of the monetary authority is given by (6.38) and (6.39). Case-I: Liquidity trapped ( = a) In this case, the subsequent monetary policy is i L = 0, hence, using (2.5), (2.6), (4.2), the Treasury maximizes The optimal state contingent reaction function of the …scal authority is given by (6.41) and (6.43) respectively. Substituting the state contingent monetary and …scal policy reaction functions in (2.5) and (2.6) one obtains Comparing (6.15) and (6.60), we see that the output targets (6.58) and (6.59) achieve the same level of social welfare as the optimal solution. Moreover, substituting from (6.58) and (6.59) into (6.38), (6.43) and (6.47)-(6.53), then comparing with Proposition 1, we see that these in ‡ation and output targets achieve the optimal solution, with the economy liquidity trapped in the bad state only. Hence, the two other cases, when the economy is never liquidity trapped and when the economy is liquidity trapped in both states, need not be considered; thus the proof is complete.
